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Abstract
This paper provides a review of the most impor-
tant and widely used Quantum Key Distribution 
systems and then describes our recently pro-
posed scheme based on Subcarrier Multiplexing 
that opens the possibility of parallel Quantum 
Key Distribution. We report the first-ever ex-
perimental implementation of parallel quantum 
key distribution using this technique showing a 
maximum multiplexing gain.
Keywords: Optical fiber communications, quan-
tum information, quantum key distribution, sub-
carrier multiplexing.
1. Introduction
Quantum Cryptography features a unique way 
of sharing a random sequence of bits between 
users with a certifiably security not attainable 
with either public or secret-key classical cryp-
tographic systems. This is achieved by means 
of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques, 
which rely on exploiting the laws of quantum 
mechanics [1]. Indeed, only systems based on 
QKD techniques can offer unconditional security 
without imposing any computational assump-
tions [2].
A main limitation of QKD systems, and still to 
be solved, is the fact that bit rates are very low 
compared to those used in classical telecommu-
nications [3]. One of the main restrictions to date 
Practical Quantum Key Distribution based 
on the BB84 protocol 
relies on photon sources and the so-called pho-
ton guns are far from ready. An alternative and 
also a complementary approach to increase the 
bit rate is to make QKD systems work in paral-
lel. This simple engineering approach becomes a 
challenge when working with quantum systems: 
The system should work in parallel but still rely 
on just one source and its security should still be 
guaranteed by the principles of quantum me-
chanics both when Alice prepares the photons 
and when Bob “measures” the incoming states. 
At the same time the multiplexing technique 
should be safe to Eve gaining any information. 
In this context, recent progress in the literature 
[4] remarks that photonics is a key enabling 
technology for implementing commercial QKD 
systems to become a competitive technology in 
Information Security. For this to happen at a rea-
sonable cost, it is fundamental to take advantage 
of the currently available generation of photonic 
components developed for applications in the 
telecommunications field. Therefore, our over-
all objective is to implement and demonstrate 
practical QKD systems based on available opti-
cal communication devices and optical multi-
plexing techniques feature securing operation 
outperforming currently available alternatives. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 
we provide some basic notions of QKD, includ-
ing the description of the generic settings and 
techniques so far proposed for its implementa-
tion and the most typical protocol, known as 
BB84. In section 3, we present different configu-
rations reported in the literature that allow the 
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an unknown quantum state while keeping the 
original intact [5]. Both these arguments are ex-
ploited in the BB84 protocol, probably the best 
known and most widely employed scheme in 
QKD systems. 
The BB84 protocol is a discrete variable coding 
named after its inventors Charles Bennet and 
Gilles Brassard and the year of its first publica-
tion (1984) [1].  In this protocol, Alice prepares 
and sends to Bob a set of random qubits. These 
are selected from the following set of four states:
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The first two states in (1) form one base of a 
quantum two dimensional system while the 
other two from a second one. Therefore, the 
conditions  and  correspon-
ding to scalar products between states have to 
be satisfied. At the same time, the states in the 
different basis of (1) are not orthogonal and have 
maximum overlapping. As a consequence, there 
is no measurement procedure that can determi-
ne with 100% certainty the specific state which is 
prepared by Alice and it is sent to Bob.
For every incoming state from Alice, Bob ran-
domly chooses one of the two basis to measure, 
either Base 1 or Base 2, performs the measure-
ment and records the results. This measurement 
procedure employed by Bob allows the deter-
mination of the bit sent by Alice. Once quantum 
communication has finished, Bob and Alice use a 
public channel to communicate certain proper-
ties relative to the states that she has sent and he 
has measured.  Specifically, Bob announces the 
position of the detected bits and the basis used, 
this stream is called raw key. Alice and Bob re-
tain the bits for which the basis employed in the 
encoding and the decoding processes coincide 
and discard the rest. In this base reconciliation, 
Alice does not reveal the particular value of the 
state and Bob does not indicate the results of the 
measurement. This roughly results in a subset of 
around half of the bits originally detected by 
Bob. This subset is called the sifted key.
In the process of qubit sending from Alice to Bob 
an eavesdropper, known as Eve, can intercept 
some or all of them interfering the communi-
cation process. Eve can implement this attack 
through a kind of channel measurement, for 
example a projective measurement carried over 
the qubit, by means of an intercept and re-re-
send scheme. As it has been mentioned before, 
in the second part of this protocol Alice and Bob 
implementation of the BB84 protocol by using 
optical polarization, optical phase or frequency 
modulation as encoding techniques. Section 4 
presents the theoretical principles of a quantum 
key distribution system that opens the possibil-
ity of parallel:  quantum key distribution based 
on subcarrier multiplexing (SCM) technique or 
SCM-QKD. In section 5 we report some prelimi-
nary results of an experimental prototype for a 
SCM-QKD implementation operating with two 
radiofrequency subcarriers.  The obtained re-
sults in quantum and classical regime demon-
strate the system feasibility.
2. SRR-loaded CPW models
Figure 1 illustrates a typical QKD system. Two 
partners who are traditionally called Alice and 
Bob want to establish a secret key at a distance. 
They need to be connected by two channels: a 
quantum channel, allowing them to share quan-
tum signals; and a classical channel, -which needs 
to be authenticated-, (i.e Alice and Bob must cer-
tifiably identify themselves). On the other hand, 
a third person can listen to the conversation but 
cannot participate in it. The quantum channel, 
however, is open to any possible manipulation 
from a third party. Specifically, the task of Alice 
and Bob is to guarantee security against an ad-
versarial eavesdropper, usually called Eve, tap-
ping on the quantum channel and listening to 
the exchanges on the classical channel [2, 3]. 
The fact that security can be based on general 
principles of quantum physics suggests the pos-
sibility of unconditional security, i.e. the possibil-
ity of guaranteeing security without imposing 
any restriction on the power of the eavesdrop-
per. Indeed, the origin of security of QKD can 
be traced back to some fundamental principles 
of quantum physics. Firstly, a well-know princi-
ple of quantum physics establishes that meas-
urement in general modifies the state of the 
measure systems and secondly, the no-cloning 
theorem which states that one cannot duplicate 
 Figure 1. Diagram of a QKD system where Alice 
and Bob are connected by a quantum channel into 
which Eve can tap without any restriction other 
than the laws of physics; and by an authenticated 
classical channel, into which Eve can only listen to.
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When the pulses reach Bob’s location they are 
extracted from the fiber and travel through a set 
of waveplates used to recover the initial polari-
zation states by compensating for the transfor-
mation induced by the optical fiber. After that, 
the pulses reach a symmetric beamsplitter (BS), 
implementing the random base choice. The Base 
1 is performed with the rotation of the polariza-
tion state with a waveplate by π/4. Transmitted 
photons are analyzed in this vertical-horizontal 
base with a polarizing BS and two photon-
counting detectors. Also, the photons are ana-
lyzed with a second set of polarizing BS and pho-
ton-counting detectors that characterize Base 2.
As example, we consider a photon polarized at 
π/4 that Alice emits and launches into the optical 
fiber link. At Bob’s end, if it chooses the output 
of the BS corresponding to Base 2 (vertical-hori-
zontal), it will experience an equal probability of 
reflection or transmission at the polarizing BS, 
yielding a random outcome. On the other hand, 
if it chooses the diagonal Base 1, its state will be 
rotated to π/4. The polarizing BS will then reflect 
it with unit probability, yielding a deterministic 
outcome. 
Antoine Buller and co-workers [8] have used 
such a system to perform QKD experiments over 
optical fibers. They created a key over a distance 
of 1100 meters with photons at 800 nm. In order 
to increase the transmission distance, they re-
peated the experiment with photons at 1300 nm 
and created a key over a distance of 23 km [9]. 
Record rates over 1Mb/s have been reported by 
Tang et al from NIST [10] and a distance record or 
200 Km featuring a key rate of 15 bit/s has been 
very recently reported by Liu et al [11]. 
3.2. Phase Encoding Systems
Although the original BB84 coding scheme was 
designed to exploit the quantum properties of 
single photon polarization states, phase coding 
schemes can also be realized [12]. These coding 
schemes are based on the properties of inter-
ferometers and the coding is implemented by 
changing the relative optical path lengths or 
phase between the internal arms of the interfer-
ometer. Two typical layouts to implement a BB84 
protocol are shown in figure 3 which are based 
on a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (single or un-
balanced).
Figure 3(a) shows how Alice and Bob can control 
a phase modulator in their respective half of the 
interferometer. If Alice sends a single photon 
into this device an interference phenomenon 
will be observed, the photon will be detected at 
only one of Bob’s photodetectors, either “0” or 
“1”, with a probability that varies with the phase 
difference ∆φ=φA-φB in an identical fashion to 
the classical interference pattern.
If, for example, ∆φ=0 the photon will arrive at de-
tector “0”, whereas if ∆φ=π the photon will arrive 
at detector “1”. For intermediate values of the 
photon behaves probabilistically; for example, if 
make public the basis employed to encode and 
detect the bits respectively the outcome of this 
process resulting in the generation of the raw 
key. In principle, it is thought possible for the 
eavesdropper Eve to know part of the key but 
the QKD system permits Alice and Bob to detect 
the presence of Eve.  Note that Eve has to choose 
one of the basis to perform the projective mea-
surement and determine incoming state. There-
fore, she has a 50% probability of employing the 
incorrect base in her measurements resulting in 
a disagreement between what Bob detects and 
Alice has sent.  In this way, Alice and Bob have 
a very simple way to detect the presence of Eve 
by performing an error detection check by sha-
ring a subset of the bits. If the error rate of this 
process is small then Alice and Bob can perform 
other processes known as error correction and 
privacy amplification over the rest of the bits in 
the key that have not been made public.  Privacy 
amplification is a classical operation and can be 
carried out, for example, by taking pairs of bits in 
the key and performing an OR exclusive opera-
tion. If Alice and Bob obtain the same result they 
retain the pair of bits. Otherwise they discard 
both of them. The unconditional security of the 
BB84 protocol has been proved with many diffe-
rent techniques [6, 7]. 
3. Review of Fiber Optic Quantum 
Key Distribution Systems
Basically, the BB84 protocol has been implement-
ed through different experimental schemes that 
we describe in this section. 
3.1. Polarization Encoding Systems
A QKD system with the BB84 protocol using the 
polarization of photons is shown in figure 2. 
Alice’s transmitter consists of four laser diodes 
which emit short classical photon pulses po-
larized at -π/4, 0, π/4, and π/2. For a given bit, a 
single diode is triggered. The pulses are then at-
tenuated by a set of filters to reduce the average 
number of photons lower than 1, and sent along 
the quantum channel to Alice. It is essential that 
the pulses remain polarized for Bob to be able to 
extract the information encoded by Alice.
Left-handed 
substances 
have negative 
index of 
refraction, 
negative phase 
advance, and 
the reversal of 
the Doppler 
shift and 
Vavilov-
Cerenk–ov 
effect
 Figure 2. Layout of a typical BB84 QKD system based on Polarization encoding.
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tually coherent and thus interfere. Bob can then 
record the interference pattern in these side-
bands after removal of the central frequency and 
the higher-order sidebands with an optical filter. 
The advantage of this setup is that the interfer-
ence is controlled by the phase of the radio fre-
quency oscillators. Their frequency is six orders 
of magnitude smaller than the optical frequency 
and thus considerably easier to stabilize and syn-
chronize [17]. 
Merolla and co-workers, using this approach, 
have reported in [18] a secure key rate of 
19.2bit/s for a fiber distance of 50 km.
∆φ=π/2 or ∆φ=-π/2 the photon is equally likely 
to be observes at “0” or “1”. If any measurement 
is applied to this system to determine which arm 
the photon is “in” then the interference, or phase, 
information is destroyed.
The main problem of this configuration is that it 
is practically impossible to keep the path differ-
ence stable when Alice and Bob are separated by 
more than a few meters. In order to overcome 
this limitation, Bennet proposed the use of two 
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers, one 
for Alice and one for Bob, connected in series by 
a single optical fiber, as shown in figure 3(b).
Townsed and co-workers [13], were the first to 
test this system over a fiber optic spool of 10 
Km. To our knowledge, record values using this 
approach have been reported in [14] where 
a secure key rate of 1.02Mbit/s for a fiber dis-
tance of 20 km and 10.1 kbit/s for 100 km have 
been demonstrated by Shields an co-workers at 
Toshiba.
3.3. Frequency Coded Systems
As we have shown in previous subsection, 
phase-based systems for QKD require phase syn-
chronization and stabilization. Because of the 
high frequency of optical waves (approximately 
200 THz at 1550 nm), this condition is difficult to 
fulfill. To overcome this limitation Goedgebuer 
and co-workers [15] proposed an alternative 
solution where the value of the bits is coded in 
the relative phase between sidebands of a cen-
tral optical frequency subject to radiofrequency 
modulation. This is known as the frequency cod-
ing approach illustrated in figure 4.
The technique implements the BB84 protocol as 
follows [16]: A source emits short pulses of classi-
cal monochromatic light with angular frequency 
ω
0
. A first electrooptical modulator EOMA modu-
lates the phase of this beam with a radiofrequen-
cy Ω<<ω
0
 and a small modulation depth. Two 
sidebands are thus generated at frequencies 
ω
0
±Ω. The phase modulator is driven by a radio-
frequency local oscillator LOA whose phase φA 
can be varied among four phase values 0, π and 
π/2, 3π/2, which form a pair of conjugate basis. 
Finally, the beam is attenuated so that the side-
bands contain much less than one photon per 
pulse, while the central peak remains classical. 
After the transmission link, the beam experienc-
es a second modulation applied by an electroop-
tical modulator EOMB. This phase modulator is 
driven by a second radio-frequency local oscilla-
tor LOB with the same frequency Ω and phase φB 
which can be varied among two phase values 0 
and π/2 which represent the choice between the 
two encoding basis.
These oscillators must be synchronized. After 
passing through this device, the beam contains 
the original central frequency ω
0
, the sidebands 
created by Alice, and the sidebands created by 
Bob. The sidebands at frequencies ω
0
±Ω are mu-
 Figure 3. Layout of a QKD system using Phase coding for (a) single Mach-
Zehnder configuration and (b) unbalanced Mach-Zehnder configuration.
 Figure 4. Layout of a Frequency Coded QKD transmission system.
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In the above expression, ρ is the detection ef-
ficieny, μi represents the mean photon number 
per bit emitted by the laser source for subcarrier 
Ωi , Ti is the end-to-end optical link transmission 
efficiency for subcarrier Ωi, V is the visibility, 
and ∆Φi represents the mismatch between the 
phases inscribed by Alice and Bob into the sub-
carrier at Ωi . The correct choice of the basis by 
Bob for subcarrier Ωi results in either ∆Φi=0 or 
∆Φi=π depending on whether a ‘0’ or ‘1’ is sent 
by Alice. This implies, according to (2), that either 
the LSB or the USB is eliminated respectively due 
to interference. When Bob chooses the incorrect 
base, then ∆Φi=±π/2 and none of the sidebands 
is eliminated since the detection probability is 
equal for USB and LSB.
For the sake of simplicity and for illustrative pur-
poses, we consider here the case where Alice 
and Bob implement the system using six differ-
ent microwave signals with frequencies fi=Ωi/2π. 
With this approach we have performed exten-
sive simulations that include all the relevant 
parameters previously discussed as shown in 
Figure 6. When the relative phase difference ∆Φi 
used by Alice and Bob is either 0 or π, the carrier 
and either upper frequencies or lower frequen-
cies sidebands are detected. When ∆Φi=±π/2 
then the carrier and all the sidebands are de-
tected. However, as pointed out earlier, the main 
advantage of using this system is that it provides 
the possibility to Alice of sending different bits 
using two or more independently encoded dif-
ferent radio-frequency tones. 
Specifically, figure 6(a) illustrates the case where 
there is a perfect matching between the basis 
employed by Alice and Bob for each subcarrier 
and Alice is sending the sequence 000000. In this 
case, all the frequencies fi have a relative phase 
difference ∆Φi= 0 and consequently upper side-
bands appear in the right side of the optical 
frequency spectrum. In the case represented in 
figure 6(b), there is a perfect matching between 
the basis employed by Alice and Bob for each 
subcarrier and Alice is sending the sequence 
111111. The relative phase difference ∆Φi = π 
for all subcarriers and consequently lower side-
bands appear in the left side of the optical fre-
quency spectrum.
On the other hand, figure 6(c) and 6(d) repre-
sents the case when the same sequence 011010 
is sent from Alice to Bob where the first bit cor-
responds to the electrical subcarrier f6 and the 
last bit to the electrical subcarrier f1. Figure 6(c) 
shows the case where Bob chooses the incorrect 
base for all the subcarriers. In this case, the rela-
tive phase difference ∆Φi =±π/2 and according 
to (2) the probability is equal for USB and LSB 
and 12 optical sidebands appear as we can see 
in figure 6(c). In figure 6(d), Bob makes the cor-
rect base decision for odd subcarriers f1 , f3 and 
f5 (note a single optical sideband is obtained) 
and the incorrect for even subcarriers f
2 
, f
4
 and 
f6 (note two optical sidebands are obtained). 
4. Description of SCM-QKD 
Systems
We have proposed to apply the the concept of 
subcarrier multiplexing to extend the capacity of 
frequency coding schemes for QKD systems. We 
show here that by taking advantage of the fact 
that quantum mechanics allows for multiple-fre-
quency measurements, multiple subcarrier fre-
quencies can be simultaneously used to increase 
the bit rate without compromising the security 
of the protocol. SCM-QKD can be explained re-
ferring to figure 5. A faint pulse laser source 
emitting at frequency ω
0
=2πf
0
 is externally mod-
ulated by N radiofrequency subcarriers by Alice. 
Each subcarrier with angular frequency Ωi=2πfi, 
is generated by a local oscillator (LOi) and ran-
domly phase modulated among four possible 
values 0, π and π/2, 3π/2 which let the encoding 
of the bits and form a pair of conjugated basis 
required to implement a BB84 protocol. The 
compound signal is then sent through an opti-
cal fiber link and, upon reaching Bob’s location 
is externally modulated by N identical subcarri-
ers in a second modulator. These subcarriers are 
phase modulated among two possible values 
0 and π/2, which represent the choice between 
the two basis, to decode the bits. As a conse-
quence, an interference single-photon signal is 
generated at each of the sidebands (upper and 
lower) of each subcarrier.
According to the results derived in [19], the de-
tection probabilities at each of the detectors 
placed after the filters centered at the Upper 
Sideband (USB) and the Lower Sideband (LSB) 
for each subcarrier, which correspond to ω
0
+Ωi 
and at ω
0
-Ωi , respectively, are given by:
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 Figure 5.  SCM-QKD system layout (electrical signal is in dashed line, optical sig-
nal in solid line). SPAD: Single Photon Avalanche Detector.
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variation for different channels are parallel pro-
vided the link length is not too close to the limit 
point imposed by error correction and privacy 
amplification. The comparison between the use-
ful bit rate achieved for a given multiplex and that 
achieved for the case N=1 gives the multiplexing 
gain MG. Ideally the multiplexing gain should be 
given precisely by N. The main effects of the in-
dex of modulation on the system performance 
are two: on one hand the multiplexing gain is 
reduced so MG<N. On the other hand the link 
length span across which MG is constant is re-
duced. For low values of the index of modulation 
(m<10%) the multiplexing gain remains constant 
and equal to the number of channels (N) in the 
multiplex for of link lengths spanning up to 85 
Km. Nonlinear signal mixing effects start to be 
noticeable in the useful bit rate for modulation 
indexes close to 10%.
Therefore, the final transmitted bits are {100} 
since the 50% of the transmitted key is discarded 
due to the basis reconciliation. 
In this context, the independence of the bits 
transmission between different subcarriers is 
clearly seen since the multiple subcarriers does 
not lead to interference between bits. The sys-
tem can be secure against photon number 
splitting attacks if the reference optical carrier is 
filtered and detected since Bob gets a time ref-
erence for detection and he will gather informa-
tion about possible attacks of the fiber link at the 
same time [20].
In principle, the objective of using multiplexing 
techniques in the context of these systems is to 
increase the achievable key rates by a factor of 
N (N being the number of channels in the mul-
tiplex. We now investigate the conditions under 
which the above objective is fulfilled. For a single 
channel the rate of the sifted key as a function of 
distance is given by:   
  
            
(3)
where  frep  is the pulse repetition frequency of 
the optical source. To calculate the useful key 
rate as a function of distance we need to know 
the fraction of bits lost due to error correction 
and privacy amplification which depends on 
the strategy followed by the eavesdropper. In 
general we can express the useful key rate as 
the product of the sifted key rate and the differ-
ence between the Alice-Bob mutual information 
I(A,B,Ωi ) and Eve’s maximal Shannon informa-
tion  Imax (A,E, Ωi) [6], which is given by
                            (4)
For the multiplexed system, the overall useful 
key rate is then given by:
                             
 
(5)
In figure 7 we have plotted with a blue line the 
useful key rate for N=1 with the following (typi-
cal) parameters; frep =10MHz, V=98%, detector 
efficiency ρ=0.1, α=0.2 dB/km and T=10 dB. The 
curve features an exponential decrease first, and 
then, due to error correction and privacy ampli-
fication, the bit rate fell rapidly to zero.
For the sake of comparison with the frequency 
coding case (i.e. N=1), we consider in figure 7 
also the high (N=50), intermediate (N=30) and 
low (N=15) count SCM-QKD options. All the 
curves show a similar behavior, the useful rate 
 Figure 6. Simulated power spectra for perfect matching between the basis em-
ployed by Alice and Bob for each subcarrier and Alice is sending (a) the sequence 
000000 and (b) the sequence 111111. In case (c), Bob makes the incorrect basis de-
cision for all the subcarriers and in case (d), Bob makes the correct basis decision for 
subcarriers f1 , f3 and f5 . For cases (c) and (d), the sequence is 011010.
 Figure 7. Overall useful key rate values versus the optical fiber link length in Km, 
obtained for the three frequency plan (N=15, N=30 and N=50) systems and for the 
case of a frequency coded (N=1) system when the index modulation is  m= 2 %.
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The multiplexing gain can be defined math-
ematically as:
                                                               
(6)
where  Rnet (Ω1 ) is the  useful rate when N=1.
For instance, figure 8 shows the evolution of the 
multiplexing gain computed at L=30 Km as a 
function of the modulation index for the three 
frequency plans under consideration. Note that 
the multiplexing gains remain very close to 
the ideal values for low values of the index of 
modulation. In particular for values up to a 5% 
the SCM-QKD system performance is immune 
to nonlinear signal mixing. Beyond this range 
the multiplexing gain decreases at a rate that is 
faster the higher number of channels. These re-
sults, which have been computed for a particu-
lar source pulse repetition frequency ( frep = 10 
MHz), scale with this parameter in terms of us-
able key bit rate. 
 5.  Experimental demonstration 
In order to demonstrate the SCM-QKD principle 
of operation, we have assembled an experimen-
tal testbed transmitting two subcarriers, which 
is shown in figure 9. It consists of two blocks, 
named Alice and Bob, interconnected by sev-
eral meters of optical fiber. Alice’s transmitter 
contains a tunable laser source with an emission 
wavelength of 1557.2 nm and 5 dBm of optical 
power. The laser output is strongly attenuated in 
order to achieve the quantum regime and pulsed 
with an amplitude modulator biased at the mini-
mum transmission point. The electrical driving 
signal of the pulsed modulator is generated by 
the control system. The optical signal is modu-
lated by a Phase Modulator (PM), the RF input of 
which is fed by two RF subcarriers at f1=10 and 
f2=15 GHz, respectively, which are produced by 
two independent local oscillators. To encode the 
binary secret key, Alice introduces a random and 
independent phase shift Φ1A and Φ2A for each 
subcarrier. An electrical attenuator is placed at 
the input of each phase shifter (Att1A and Att2A ) 
so as to control independently the modulation 
indexes of both subcarriers (m1A and m2A)
On the other hand, Bob has a similar configu-
ration as Alice, but in this case the input signal 
of Bob is modulated by means of an Amplitude 
Modulator (AM) biased in quadrature. Bob can 
insert its own random phase shifts Φ1B and Φ2B 
and the attenuations Att1B and Att2B to control 
the RF signal driving its modulator. The phase 
shifts inserted in Alice and Bob are implemented 
using four eight-bit tunable RF phase shifters. 
The four phase shifters are computer controlled 
independently and are capable of providing full 
360º phase shifts with a 1.4º resolution step. The 
control system also provides full system synchro-
nization and clock generation. The phase shifts 
inserted by Alice and Bob were implemented 
using four eight-bit tunable phase shifters. In 
figure 10 we can see a general a visual system 
description.
The system’s performance was checked in the 
classical regime with the aid of an optical spec-
trum analyzer (OSA), featuring a 10 pm resolu-
tion, placed at the output of Bob’s modulator. 
In figure 11 we can observe the theoretical and 
experimental signal for all the possible phase 
differences ∆Φ1= Φ1B -Φ1A and  ∆Φ2= Φ2B -Φ2A 
corresponding to f1=10 and f2=15 GHz, respec-
tively. The modulation indexes are around 3 % 
to guarantee a full multiplexing gain. The pres-
ence and absence of optical sidebands due to 
constructive and destructive interference can 
be readily checked which corresponds with the 
case that Alice and Bob choose the same base. 
The presence of equal amplitude sidebands cor-
responds with the case that the basis chosen by 
Alice and Bob do not match. The matching be-
tween experimental and theoretical results is re-
markable and shows the feasibility of SCM QKD 
systems in the classical regimen.
One of the main practical difficulties for the im-
plementation of FC-QKD, and in particular SCM-
QKD, is the filtering of each of the RF sidebands 
 Figure 8.  Multiplexing gains in the overall useful 
key rate values versus the modulation index compu-
ted at z=30Km for the three frequency plan (N=15, 
N=30 and N=50) systems.
 Figure 9.  Experimental setup assembled in the 
laboratory to test the feasibility of a two channel sub-
carrier multiplexed quantum key distribution system
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repetition rate of 1 MHz. The SPADs worked with 
a detection gate width of 2.5 ns which was syn-
chronized with the source, and a dead time of 10 
µsec to avoid afterpulsing. The SPADs detection 
efficiency ρ was close to 10%, the dark count 
probability was 1.2x10-5, and the measurement 
time per point was set to 25 s. The mean pho-
ton number is μ1 = 0.35 for 10 GHz and μ2 = 0.25 
for 15 GHz. Note that these values are enough 
to guarantee unconditional security provided 
that decoy states [7] transmission is introduced 
in order to relax the requirements of the mean 
photon number at Alice’s output.
in the optical domain at the output of Bob’s 
modulator. A photonic filter structure based on 
Fiber Bragg Gratings (FGBs) has been designed 
and fabricated to separate each sideband with an 
extinction ratio of 25 dB while introducing mini-
mum insertion losses [21]. At each output of the 
filter structure we placed a Single Photon Ava-
lanche Detector (SPAD) acting as photon counter. 
We also checked the system performance in the 
quantum regime by attenuating the pulsed sig-
nal of Alice’s source and placing SAPD’s at the 
output of the filters as described in figure 10. 
The output pulses had a 1.3 ns FWHM with a 
 Figure 10.  Experimental setup assembled in the laboratory to test the feasibility of a two channel subcarrier 
multiplexed quantum key distribution system
 Figure 11.  Experimental (black line) and theoretical (red line) results and for a two subcarrier SCM-QKD system 
for different phase match values between Alice and Bob. Subcarrier frequencies are 10 and 15 GHz respectively.
Potential 
use of these 
miniaturized 
high-Q 
cells can be 
foreseen in 
biosensors 
and planar 
frequency 
filtering 
structures
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rate of 1 MHz and a pulse width around 1.5 ns. 
The experimental measurements show the fea-
sibility of obtaining visibility values close to 98% 
as required for the successful operation of these 
systems. Moreover, the theoretical predictions are 
in agreement with the experimental results dem-
onstrating the real viability of the system. 
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